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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT
..
'
Platntrff and Respondent,

!'

, Case No.
9317

vs.

I

LOIS A. HISLOP, et al.,

\'

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
This suit was filed by the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District, hereinafter referred to as the ((District," to condemn
certain lands and easements for the enlargetnent of the Pineview Reservoir. Included was a small tract of land belonging
to the appellant which was farm or pasture land entirely
unrelated to the property in the Town of Huntsville upon
which "Jack's Shack'' is located. This appeal does not involve
the land which the District brought suit to condemn.
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The appellant has by her counterclaim attempted to
engraft upon the condemnation suit an action for damages
allegedly caused by the relocation of a highway pursuant to a
contract between the United States of America and the State
Road Commission of Utah, dated June 30, 1955, which provides for the relocation of the part of the old highway) No.
39, from Ogden to Huntsville which would be affected by the
enlargement of the Pineview Reservoir. The contract, marked
Exhibit I, was received in evidence in this case. Paragraphs
5 and 6 provide:
((5. The Highway Department will relocate and reconstruct that portion of State Highways, Number 39,
between Points A and B into the town of Huntsville,
Utah, and Number 162, between Points G and F, into
the town of Eden, Utah, respectively, together with a
spur to connect with the Liberty highway from Number
162 beginning at Point H and running in a northerly
direction for approximately 0.65 of a mile, all as
shown in blue on the location map attached hereto
and made a part hereof, marked Exhibit 1, or at such
other locations as may be mutually agreed upon by the
parties hereto. The total of the relocated State highways amounts to approximately 5.0 miles. The said
Highway Department will also reconstruct and relocate
pursuant to the authority granted the Highway Department by the County, that portion of the County's
road system between the towns of Huntsville and Eden
between Points B and C and between Points D and E
shown in Green on said Exhibit 1 or at such other
points as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties
hereto, and comprising a total of approximately 1.7
miles. All relocated roads to be constructed by the
Highway Department will include approaches and
access roads for use by adjacent landowners and all
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other appurtenances in connection with the relocations.
The relocated portions of said highways and roads
are hereinafter referred to as relocated highways. The
Highway Department will acquire all rights-of-way
for the relocated highways except those to be acquired
by the United States as provided in Article 8 hereof.
Contracts for such relocation and reconstruction work
shall be awarded by the Highway Department to best
bidders based on public invitation for bids. The Highway Department agrees that the relocated highways,
including all bituminous surfacing, will be completed
by April 1, 1957. The relocated highways will be constructed to a standard equal to the highways and roads
before relocation, typical sections of which are shown
on Exhibits 2 and 3 attached hereto and made a part
hereof, and will be constructed in accordance with
plans and specifications to be prepared by the Highway
Department and approved by the United States. Should
the Highway Department desire to construct the relocated highways or any of them to a standard superior
to that described above, the additional cost of such
superior construction shall be borne by the Highway
Department. The Highway Department will, at its
sole cost and expense, operate and maintain the relocated State highways and the County will at its sole
cost and expense, operate and maintain the relocated
County roads.
"6. The United States will pay to the Highway Department for the faithful performance of this contract,
not to exceed the sum of Six Hundred and Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($650,000.00) in appropriate
installments as the work on the relocated highways
progresses, based on monthly certified cost statements
showing contractors earnings and administrative and
general expenses directly related to the work." (Emphasis added) .
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It will be noted that in paragraph 5 the Highway Department (State Road Commission of Utah) agrees to "acquire all
rights-of-way for the relocated highways" (except between
certain stations not involved here). The United States agreed
to pay to the Highway Department, nfor the faithful performance of this contract not to exceed the sum of Six Hundred
and Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ( $650,000.00) in
appropriate installments ... " See paragraph 6.
The District is not a party to the contract, and there is
no evidence or stipulation that the District had anything whatever to do with the selection of the route of the new road or
with its construction.
It is apparent from the pleadings, the stipulation of facts
and the map attached to the stipulation that the relocation
of the main road to Huntsville did not affect the appellant's
access to the existing streets in Huntsville. They have not been
changed. Ingress and egress, approach, and grade are not
changed. There has been no physical change in the roads upon
which appellant's property fronts.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The District is not liable for damages caused by the
road relocation.
2. The diverting of traffic is not compensable.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT IS NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
CAUSED BY THE ROAD RELOCATION.
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The appellant is seeking to recover damages from the
District which allegedly result, not from any action or taking
by the District, but from the relocation of a road by the State
Road Commission pursuant to a written contract, Exhibit I,
between the United States and the State Road Commission.
The District is not a party to the contract under which the
road was relocated, did not choose the route, and had nothing
whatever to do with the construction. Furthermore, the contract
expressly provides that the State Road Commission shall acquire
rights-of-way and that the United States shall pay not to exceed
$650,000.00 for the rights-of-way and road construction.
There is no casual connection insofar as the District is
concerned between the condemnation by the District of land
\\"hich would be inundated by the reservoir, and the relocation
of a highway by the State Road Commission under a contract
with the United States. These activities are separate and
distinct. The District was obligated to acquire and pay for
lands in the enlarged reservoir site, and the present condemnation case was filed to carry out that responsibility. The
United States and the State Road Commission were obligated
to accomplish the road relocation. Damages flowing from the
taking of the reservoir site lands must be paid for by the
District and damages resulting from the road relocation must
be paid by the State Road Commission out of the $650,000.00
provided for that purpose.
The appellant's theory ts that because the Pineview
Reservoir is being enlarged, the roads must be relocated and
if the roads are relocated and damage results, this damage
should be paid by the District because the Weber Basin Project

7
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is being built for the District. If this line of reasoning were
followed to its logical conclusions suit would lie against any
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries of a public project By
the same sort of logic it could be well contended that the
Weber Basin Project is largely for the benefit of the City of
Ogden, therefore the City of Ogden should be liable for
damage caused by the relocation of the road. The District
had no more to do with the road relocation than the City.
No cases have been cited by the appellant in support of her
position on this point and indeed none could be.
The only case we have been able to find in which a landowner sought to recover damages from a party other than
the one actually relocating the highway is Cranley v. Boyd
County and the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co., 266 Ky.
569, 99 SW 2d 737. In that case the location of a highway was
changed to avoid a railway grade crossing, and a landowner
who conducted a business which had formerly been conveniently
located for patronage but which could not thereafter be
reached except by a circuitous route, sued both the County
and the Railway Company. A directed verdict for the Railway
Company was sustained as it did not construct the road. The
road was constructed by the County.
In the instant case the road was relocated by the Road
Commission and not by the District and therefore no action
will lie against the District. It is submitted that the order
denying the appellant's motion for a summary judgment should
be sustained on this ground alone.

THE DIVERTING OF TRAFFIC IS NOT COMPENSABLE.
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Both of the appellant's points stated on page 6 of her
brief are based upon the assumption that a landowner has a
property right in the flow of traffic on a highway adjacent
to his place of business. It is argued that if the volume of
traffic is diminished by reason of re-routing noccasioned solely
by reason of the enlargement of a reservoir which submerges
an existing highway," such loss of traffic flow is compensable
because the re-routing is not a traffic regulation under the
police power. In other words, the contention is that damages
caused by road route changes made for reasons of safety and
convenience are not compensable, but damages flowing from
changes made for other reasons are compensable.
The attempted distinction although interesting from an
academic standpoint has no application in this case. The
vital weakness in the appellant's argument is that the facts
show no damage to any property or property right.
Let us examine the nature and extent of the property
rights incident to the ownership of land abutting on a public
street. Whether a landowner owns the fee title to the street
subject to the right of the public to travel it, or whether the
title has passed to the state, county or city he has a right of
access, light and air. The following excerpt from the opinion
in the early case of Dooley Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit
Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229, quoted in the case of State v. District
Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P 2d 502, clearly defines such rights:
When land is settled upon and occupied as a
town site, and lots are sold, the right of way over the
streets in front of such lots is an appurtenance of necessity, and it requires no special grant in the deed. [Citing
cases. J The rights of access, light, and air constitute
C(

•

•

•
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the principal values of such property, and it must be
presurr1ed that when lots are sold the grantees purchase
them with a view to the advantages and benefits which
attach to them because of these easements. The right
of the grantee to their use is precisely the same as
his right to the property itself. Such privileges are
easements in fee,-incorporeal hereditaments,- and
form a part of the estate in the lots. They attach at the
time the land is platted and the lots are sold, and will
remain a perpeh1al incumbrance upon the land burdened with them. * * * Equally in both cases the
abutting owners are entitled to the use of the street
as a means of access to their lots, and for light and
air. If the fee is in the city, the rights of the abutter are
in the nature of equitable easements in fee; if in the
abutter, they are in their nature legal. In either case
the abutters have the right to have the street kept open
and not obstructed so as to interfere with their easements, and materially diminish the value of their property ... "
But the owner of land abutting on a highway has no
property or other vested right in the flow of traffic on a street.
In the case of State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 288 P. 181, the
court said:
''The owner of land abutting on a highway established by the public has no property or other vested
right in the continuance of it as a highway at public
expense, and, at least in the absence of deprivation
of ingress and egress, cannot claim damages for its
mere discontinuance, although such discontinuance
diverts traffic from his door and diminishes his trade
and thus depreciates the value of his land. [Citing
cases.]" To the same effect are State ex-rel. Johnson
v. Board of Com'rs of Deer Lodge County, 19 Mont.
582, 49 P. 147, and State v. Bradsha\v Land & Livestock Co., 99 Mont. 95, 43 P.2d 674.
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.. The same principle was stated in State Highway
Commission v. Humphreys, 58 S.W. 2d 144, 145, by
the Texas Court of Civ. App. ( 1933) quoting from the
Kansas case of Heller v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry Co.,
28 Kan. 625, as follows: .. 'The benefits which come
and go from the changing currents of travel are not
matters in respect to which any individual has any
vested right against the judgment of the public authorities.' If the public authorities could never change a
street or highway without paying all persons along
such thoroughfares for their loss of business, the cost
would be prohibitive. The highways primarily are for
the benefit of the traveling public, and are only incidentally for the benefit of those who are engaged in
business along its way. They build up their businesses
knowing that new roads may be built that will large! y
take away the traveling public. This is a risk they
must necessarily assume."
It logically follows, and it has been almost uniformly held
that a highway relocation which changes the traffic volume
passing a given business does not result in compensable injury.
Robinett v. Price, 74 Utah 512, 280 P. 736
Krebs v. State Road Com., 160 Md. 584, 154 A. 131
State v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E. 2d 53
Hempstead County v. Huddleston, 182 Ark. 276, 31
S.W. 2d 300
Richmond v. Hinton, 117 W.Va. 223, 185 S.E. 411
Kachele v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 109 Conn. 151,
145 A. 756
See Note: 118 A.L.R. 921
In the case of Kachele v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., supra,
the court said:
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ccThe action of the defendant of which the plaintiff
complains has not resulted in the closing, obstruction
or impairing-of this highway adjacent to his premises.
Neither the grade, character nor serviceability of the
street at this point has been affected. Access to, and
egress from his land can be had as freely as ever. The
sole ground upon which he rests his claim for recovery
is that highway access has been rendered more inconvenient than it was, and a more circuitous route must
be taken in approaching or leaving the property in one
direction-Where highway changes-occasion a landowner no other damage than to render access to his land
more inconvenient than it formerly was, by reason of
a circuitous route being required to be taken, he has
no right of action.''
In the case of Hempstead County v. Huddleston, supra,
the court stated the rule as follows:
UNo person has a vested right in the maintenance of
a public highway in any particular place, as the power
is in the state to relocate the road at any time in the
public interest. Therefore the change in the road did
not constitute an element of damage in this case."
If, as the cases cited hold, the appellant had no property
right in the flow of traffic there was no compensable injury
in this case. The old road still passes in front of the appellant's
property. The grade is not changed. The right of access is not
impaired. There can be no question but that the only change
is in the flow of traffic.
If no property right \vas impaired by the high,vay change
it is of no concern to the appellant \vhether the highway d1ange
\vas made to shorten the road, to avoid a dangerous curve or
to skirt a new reservoir. The State or other condemnor had
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the same right of condemnation to relocate the road to make
possible the enlargement of the reservoir as it would have
to relocate the road to avoid a dangerous curve. The public
interest requires the change in both instances.
The fact that the words tcor damaged" appear tn the
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 22, does not strengthen the
appellant's argument.
If no property right was taken or impaired the constitutional and statutory provisions have no application. Certainly
if there is no property right in the flow of traffic there has
been no impairment or taking of a property right.
The cases cited by the appellant on pages 14 and 15 of
her brief are not in point because in each case there was a
physical change which impaired the means of ingress and
egress. In the case of Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v. Glodt,
67 Colo. 115, 186 P. 904, the court pointed out that as a result
of closing certain streets the landowner was left only ((an
inadequate and dangerous way for egress on a street occupied
by a viaduct.'· In the present case the street on which the
appellant's property fronted was undisturbed for several blocks
in each direction.
There is a line of cases holding that, if as the result of the
relocation of a road, property abutting thereon is placed in
a cul de sac there is impairment of ingress and egress causing
compensable injury. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d
343, 128 P. 2d 181, 144 P. 2d 818. The cases hold, however,
that this principle is inapplicable where the obstruction in
the road or road change was beyond a street intersection. It is
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apparent from an inspection of the map on page 20 of the
appellant's brief that the cul de sac rule is not applicable here
because there are two street intersections between the appellant's place of business and the point where the old road to
Ogden is blocked by the reservoir enlargement.
The effect of applying the rule contended for by the
appellant is pointed out in the case of Richmond v. Hinton,
117 W.Va. 223, 185 S.E. 411:
The just compensation guaranteed by the
Constitution must be confined within bounds. There
must be a reasonable limit beyond which the guaranty
is not applicable. Conceding that there is difficulty in
determining just where the bounds should be laid
down, it is evident that the difficulty is accentuated
if remote and indirect damages are to be allowed.
Where would the line be drawn? Conceivably a mercantile business would have fewer patrons, and an
apartment house be rendered less desirable, and a
dwelling less eligible because of the closing of a street
two or three blocks away. A residence may be rendered
less conveniently situated with respect to the metropolitan district of the city because a street is closed at
a railroad crossing some distance away. Residential
property rna y be rendered less desirable to some occupants thereof by there being located in the vicinity
a school, a playground, or a municipal hospital. If
damages could be recovered in such circumstances,
crushing burdens \vould be imposed on the public
treasury.''
n

(

•

•

•
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that the appellant cannot prevail because the
road was not relocated by the respondent, and because the
diversion of traffic from property is not a compensable injury.
Respectfully submitted,

NEIL R. OLMSTEAD
E.]. SKEEN
Attorneys for Respondent
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